

Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India, by **Vivek Chibber**. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 334 pp. \$39.50 cloth. ISBN: 0-691-09659-7.

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In *Locked in Place*, a wonderfully researched and written book on India's developmental state, Vivek Chibber provides information important to all students of the developmental state. First, India's failure at the creation of a developmental state offers valuable lessons for developing countries with a national goal of economic development. By carefully discussing the historical legacy, state-capital relations, and conditions of the international political economy, Chibber paints a clear picture as to what a nation should avoid in pursuit of state-led economic development. The author provides a cogent analysis of the Indian state that many scholars and policy-makers have thus far largely ignored. Second, this book is a true work of comparative analysis giving equal weight to the two cases of success and failure in the creation of the developmental state and subsequent industrial development as embodied in South Korea and India. Finally, *Locked in Place* seriously challenges some key notions in the developmental state studies on South Korea and provides new insights into the significance of export-oriented industrialization (ELI) and Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs). It also questions the strong belief, in development studies of India, that the Bombay Plan of the 1944 to 1945 was "a clarion call by a nationalistic bourgeoisie to its peers, exhorting them to join the forward march of national progress" (p. 97). The author presents convincing counterevidence that the Bombay Plan was severely attacked even within the capitalist class, thus making the creation of the developmental state extremely difficult in the post-independence years.

The key contention of the book is that the underlying industrialization strategy of ELI versus import-substitution industrialization (ISI) of South Korea and India, respectively, brought about a very different type of coal-

ition (or, lack thereof) between the state and capitalists, enabling the former to forge ahead with a strong developmental state while the latter struggled in instituting an effective developmental state.

The author provides us with a revisionist perspective in understanding South Korea's development. Chibber, by examining the state-Chaebol alliance, which emerged as a result of the switch to ELI in the mid-1960s, argues that the capitalist class' compliance with the developmental state's agenda for ELI was critical for South Korea's development. More important, the Chaebol's compliance came due to an important invitation by Japanese MNCs, who offered technology transfer and promised sharing of the lucrative U.S. market for low-end light manufactured products that it was vacating in the early- to mid-1960s. This is quite different from the standard arguments in the developmental state literature on South Korea that argue (1) the developmental state was effective in enlisting cooperation from the Chaebol due to the former's ability to utilize coercive measures of the authoritarian state; (2) the state-Chaebol alliance was in place from the beginning of the push for industrialization in the early 1960s, and certainly before that for ELI; and (3) Japanese MNCs played a key role in making the state's disciplinary measures associated with the developmental state acceptable to the Chaebol. In making these arguments, Chibber provides a wealth of new evidence and a fresh interpretation of existing evidence.

Chibber challenges the standard understanding of India's failure to engender a developmental state and the necessary coalition of state-capital, and argues that India failed not because it never envisioned creating a developmental state, but because the state apparatus was inadequate, and the industrialization policy on hand, ISI, did not allow for an effective alliance between the state and capitalists. Through a careful evaluation of newly unearthed material and existing evidence, Chibber documents how the Bombay Plan of 1944 to 1945 failed to receive the necessary support from the capitalists in the wake of the end of colonialism, and how the subsequent Indian governments failed to set the course for the creation of an effective developmental state. Unlike South Korea's Economic Planning Board or Japan's

Ministry of International Trade and Industry, India's Planning Commission failed to develop into a powerful nodal agency that would coordinate industrial policies among various government ministries and also with the private sector. Furthermore, the capitalists successfully opposed the government's plan for industrial planning since they wanted only the incentives offered with a developmental state's industrial planning, but they did not welcome the disciplines that were so critical to the developmental state as can be seen in South Korea. Another key question that Chibber addresses is why India's subsequent governments of Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Sanjay Gandhi have all failed to establish a strong and effective developmental state and change the course of industrial policy, even when it was clear that ISI was a failure in the late 1950s. Again, Chibber's methodical analysis of evidence points to the debilitating government bureaucracy and state-capitalist relations that became more rent-seeking than developmental in the early years of the Indian state since independence.

Chibber's book is a strong endorsement that the Indian case should be far more significant in the theoretical discourse of the developmental state than we have previously thought, and that we should pay close attention to its underpinning lessons. Chibber's comparative study provides clearly the conditions of success and failure of a developmental state, unlike many developmental state studies, which are *ex post facto* studies of successful cases based on one nation's experience, and thus exaggerate certain attributes at the expense of alternative explanations. This book is a valuable contribution to the broad literature on economic development, not to mention to studies of India's economic struggles of the early period.

New Technologies at Work: People, Screens, and Social Virtuality, edited by **Christina Garsten** and **Helena Wulff**. Oxford, UK; New York: Berg, 2003. 250 pp. \$84.95 cloth. ISBN: 1-85973-644-0. \$28.95 paper. ISBN: 1-85973-649-1.

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New Technologies at Work explores changes in work practices brought about by and through information and communication technology from the fresh perspective of social anthropology. This shift in perspective from traditional work sociology has the advantage that the actual functions and consequences of the technology are kept empirically open, and from that openness, discoveries are made. Case studies range from hospital porters and women's computer projects to financial markets, open source software development, and dance. Even in this most physical of arts, artists explore the possibilities of connecting virtual and physical spaces, extend their collaborations and reach new audiences—while others insist on the uniqueness of live dance (Helena Wulff). In general, “new” technology and everyday practices are closely connected, and the world of virtual interaction is by no means removed from the intricacies and dilemmas of real life. Indeed, these interrelations are found to generate contradictions of their own.

Informal virtual communication on the Internet is regulated in ways embedded with and dominated by white U.S. male professional cultures. The very openness that Internet-based communities take pride in promotes informal social closure (Christina Garsten and David Lerdell). The gift culture of open source software development involves power differentials and the management of scarcities of time and attention (Magnus Bergquist). The use of computers in high-school teaching may engage formerly disruptive students in new ways, but the vast choices of information and visualizations involved in teaching visual literacy are time consuming and may induce habits of superficiality that erode other academic aims (William and Catherine Washabaugh, Mary